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This paper deals with the evaluation of some public employment policies set up in France 
during the 1980's to improve the labour market prospects of unskilled young workers. The evalua- 
tion implemented in this paper is restricted to the impact of such public measures on durations 
and outcomes of subsequent spells of unemployment and employment. The econometric study 
is conducted with non-experimental longitudinal microdata recording individual labour nlarket 
histories. A particular attention is paid to the differential effects of various types of measures, 
according to the educational evel of recipients. Programmes involving a higher level of on-the- 
job training, such as alternating work/training programmes in private firms, are principally benefi- 
cial to the less educated young workers. In contrast, for more educated young workers, "work 
fare" programmes in the public sector decrease the intensity of transition from the subsequent 
unemployment spell to regular jobs; for that subgroup, "work fare" programmes may act as a 
signal of low employment performance. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper deals with the evaluation of public employment policies set up in France during 
the 1980's to improve the labour market prospects of the most disadvantaged and unskilled 
young workers. This evaluation, however, is restricted to the impact of youth employment 
schemes on subsequent unemployment and employment durations of recipients. For that 
purpose, we estimate a reduced-form multi-state multi-spell transition model that includes 
participation in these programmes as an additional state. In this framework, participation 
in a programme (or "training") is allowed to affect the transition rates out of the state 
that follows the programme, and distinct types of programmes (namely, programmes in 
the public sector vs. programmes in the private sector) are allowed to have differential 
effects. Moreover, our model allows for possibly related unobserved heterogeneity in the 
specifications of all transition rates, thus capturing the potentially selective nature of 
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training enrolment. The empirical analysis makes use of non-experimental longitudinal 
micro data collected by INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Econo- 
miques, Paris) from 1986 to 1988. These data are based on administrative records supple- 
mented by a series of four interviews over one and a half years; they provide information 
on the dates of entry into training programmes and on durations of subsequent spells of 
employment and unemployment. 
Our paper is directly connected with previous studies estimating effects of programme 
participation by using individual transition data (see, for example, Ridder (1986), Card 
and Sullivan (1988), Ham and Lalonde (1990, 1996), Gritz (1993)). Three types of motiva- 
tion justify this approach: 
* firstly, for disadvantaged or unskilled groups of workers, it seems more natural to 
focus on re-employment rates rather than on earnings gains for which empirical evidence 
is less clear (see Bassi (1983) or Ashenfelter and Card (1985), for example); moreover, 
because public employment programmes are directed at individuals, they have to be evalua- 
ted at the individual level, with the use of longitudinal micro data; 
* secondly, there is an obvious interest in estimating separately the effects of pro- 
grammes on subsequent durations of unemployment and employment; Ham and Lalonde 
(1996, p. 176) point out that separating these effects allows the comparison of different 
programmes: for example, "policy makers may prefer to fund a programme that lengthens 
employment durations as opposed to one that shortens unemployment durations, because 
the former is likely to lead to more stable job histories and greater human capital accumula- 
tion"; moreover, estimating the two kinds of effects is necessary to evaluate the long-run 
impact of these programmes. These considerations are particularly well adapted to the 
situation of the French labour market, which was characterized uring the last fifteen years 
by the coexistence of different public employment programmes, long-term employment 
contracts (roughly speaking, "regular jobs") and short-term employment contracts 
(roughly speaking, "temporary jobs"); 
* finally, the main advantage of individual abour market transition data is that they 
include multiple spells per respondent; it is well known that, in the mixed proportional 
hazard (MPH) model for single-spell duration data, the identification of unobserved het- 
erogeneity and duration dependence relies crucially on the multiplicative nature of the 
transition rate (see Elbers and Ridder (1982) and Ridder (1990)); more recently, Honore 
(1993) has shown that this identification result is still valid in MPH multi-spell models 
without lagged duration dependence, under rather general assumptions on the joint distri- 
bution of the unobserved heterogeneity terms; this identifiability argument shows that it 
is very well possible to deal with the endogeneity of programme participation and to obtain 
reliable training effect evaluations with non-experimental continuous-time transition data.' 
Papers by Ridder (1986) and Gritz (1993) are the most important previous studies 
examining the effects of programme participation on labour market histories with the use 
of non-experimental transition data. Our paper differs from them in several aspects. For 
example, Ridder (1986) does not control for unobserved heterogeneity; moreover, he 
considers that the selection of programme participants is an exogenous process, only 
affected by the labour force state reached just before entering the programme. Obviously, 
1. It has been argued that, in order to be able to evaluate the effects of training programmes, it is necessary 
to have data from a social or natural experiment. However, contributions by Heckman and Hotz (1989), 
Heckman (1990), Dubin and Rivers (1993) and Ham and Lalonde (1996) emphasize the potential biases inherent 
in experimental studies: generally, random assignment does not eliminate all biases due to endogenous selection, 
especially in multi-stage training programmes. This limitation reduces the prior advantage of experimental data. 
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this last assumption is inappropriate: the selection is generally made by programme admin- 
istrators, but also by employers participating in the programme (or offering jobs subsidized 
through this programme), and finally by workers themselves, who either accept or refuse 
offers to participate. Our empirical analysis is much more comparable with the study made 
by Gritz (1993). Like Gritz, we treat participation in a programme as a separate (possibly 
recurrent) state of a continuous labour market transition process, and we allow entry rates 
into programmes to depend on an unobserved individual random covariate which is possi- 
bly correlated with unobserved heterogeneity terms affecting rates of transition to other 
states. Moreover, when estimating the effects of programme participation on the transition 
rates out of the state which follows the programme, we distinguish between the effects of 
different types of programmes (essentially, programmes in the public sector vs. pro- 
grammes in the private sector). However, contrary to Gritz, we stratify the sample with 
respect to the educational evel and so we can produce empirical evidence on the beneficial 
effects of "on-the-job" training programmes for the less educated young workers. A time- 
varying covariate indicating qualification to receive unemployment insurance benefits 
through the unemployment spell is also introduced, and we study the sensitivity of param- 
eter estimates to assumptions concerning the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity 
components. Finally, our statistical modelling attempts to reduce the endogenous stock 
sampling bias due to the fact that the respondents are drawn from the stock of individuals 
who were unemployed at a particular date. It also takes into account the attrition bias 
due to endogenous exits from the panel. To correct such biases, we apply the methodology 
recently introduced by Van den Berg, Lindeboom and Ridder (1994). 
Table 1.1 presents the main features of youth training programmes which were in 
effect in France during the late 1980's. Most of these programmes were launched before, 
but the numbers of participants increased greatly after the 1986 Emergency Plan for Youth 
Employment ("Plan d'Urgence pour l'Emploi des Jeunes"). This Plan introduced strong 
incentives for private firms offering training places (see Table 1.1) and facilitated the 
development of programmes with alternating spells of work and training ("formations en 
alternance", for which we propose the term "alternating work/training programmes"). 
For instance, the lower age limit for entry into such programmes has been lowered from 
18 to 16 years, while the upper age limit for entry into the apprenticeship system has been 
raised from 20 to 25 years. To simplify, we can distinguish between two types of pro- 
grammes: the alternating work/training programme provided by private firms (including 
apprenticeship, qualification and adaptation contracts, and "courses for preparation to 
the working life"; see Table 1.1), and the "workfare" programme provided by the State 
and the public sector (including community jobs and "courses for the 16-to-25 years old"; 
see Table 1.1). In this second type of programme, the amount of vocational and specific 
training is generally lower than in the first type. Then the main question we address in 
this paper is the following: can we also differentiate these two types of programme when 
we consider their impacts on durations and outcomes of subsequent unemployment and 
employment spells? Results show that these impacts depend crucially on the initial educa- 
tional level of trainees. Programmes involving a higher level of on-the-job training, such 
as alternating work/training programmes in private firms, are principally beneficial to the 
less educated young workers, who may increase their human capital and work experience 
through these programmes. In contrast, for more educated young workers, "workfare" 
programmes in the public sector decrease the intensity of transition from the subsequent 
unemployment spell to regular jobs; for that subgroup, "workfare" programmes may act 
as a signal of low employment performance. 
Section II gives some descriptive statistics on the sample. Section III presents the 
transition model and the likelihood function we estimate. Results are commented upon 
in Section IV. Our conclusions are summarized in the last section. 
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II. THE DATA 
The data used for this study are provided by the "Suivi des Chomeurs" survey collected 
by INSEE (Paris). The sample was drawn randomly in August 1986 from the files of the 
public employment service ("Agence Nationale Pour l'Emploi" or ANPE).2 About 8000 
unemployed people were sampled but only 7450 could be reached at the first interview. 
Individuals were interviewed four times, in November 1986, May 1987, November 1987, 
and finally May 1988. At the first interview, respondents were asked to give information 
on their labour market status between August and November 1986, and in particular on 
the time already spent in the unemployment spell sampled in August 1986 and on their 
status before entry into that spell. The data record retrospectively month after month, 
between November 1986 and May 1988, the events corresponding to individual transitions 
in the labour market. For that study, we consider only young men who were less than 26 
years old in August 1986 and for whom it is possible to observe an accurate and relevant 
date of registration in the ANPE files. Table 2.1 gives descriptive statistics for this sub- 
sample which contains 1337 individuals. 
TABLE 2.1 
Descriptive statistics 
Standard 
Variables Min Max Mean deviation 
French nationality 0 1 0-9289 
Age in November 1986 15 26 21-17 2-66 
Skill level 
Unskilled blue-collar worker 0 1 0 5086 
Skilled blue-collar worker 0 1 0-2094 
White-collar worker 0 1 0-1810 
Other levels 0 1 0 1010 
Educational level 
No diploma 0 1 0 5033 
Technical school certificate 0 1 0-3029 
High school diploma and above 0 1 0-092 
Non-response 0 1 0-1017 
Reason of entry into the sampled unemployment spell 
End of a temporary employment contract 0 1 0-3119 
Lay-off 0 1 0-1511 
Quit 0 1 0 2034 
First entry 0 1 0-3336 
(including after military service) 
Individual characteristics in August 1986 
Qualification for UI 0 1 0 25 
Previous participation to a programme 0 1 0- 16 
Duration of the sampled unemployment spell 1 79 13-36 11 67 
(without right-censored spells) 
Figure 2.2 presents Kaplan-Meier estimates for survival functions of durations in 
successive spells (without correction of the stock-sampling bias). These curves show that, 
during the first year of occupation, the exit rate from training programmes is lower than 
the exit rate from temporary jobs: for instance, in the first spell observed after the sampled 
unemployment spell, the mean duration of a programme is about four months while the 
mean duration of a temporary job is approximately three months. The exit rates from 
2. These files include all unemployed people registered at the ANPE who were looking either for a full- 
time or part-time permanent job, or a full-time or part-time temporary job in August 1986. These requirements 
do not correspond to the definition of unemployment given by the International Labour Office. 
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unemployment spells occurring after the second observed spell are higher than the exit 
rate from the initial unemployment spell: this could be due either to a heterogeneity bias 
(long-term vs. recurrent unemployment) or to the small length of the observation period. 
This last problem could also affect the results, because some of the programmes being 
evaluated have durations that are potentially longer than the sampling frame (e.g. the 
apprenticeship programme includes contracts of up to three years). 
Figure 2.3 gives a general description of the transitions experienced by the young 
male subsample between August 1986 and May 1988. In this figure, we consider three 
employment states: permanent employment (UDC), temporary employment (LDC), and 
employment resulting from a public employment policy (PEP). Because of the small numbers 
of corresponding transitions, we do not make any distinction between the different kinds of 
public employment policies, such as TUC, SIVP, "qualification" or "adaptation" 
contracts, . . . described in the introduction. Moreover, besides the usual states of unemploy- 
ment (U) and out-of-labour-force (OLF), we treat the phenomenon of attrition as a particu- 
lar state of the transition process. Individuals who leave the panel through attrition do not 
re-enter the sample at following interviews. Consequently, attrition (A) is an absorbing state. 
Because public employment policies are mainly oriented towards low-educated or 
low-experienced young people, we have stratified the young male subsample according to 
the educational level. Four groups may be distinguished (see Table 2.1): 
* the first one has no diploma (less than 9 years of schooling): it represents 50 33% 
of the sample, 
* the second one gets a technical school certificate (called a C.A.P. or a B.E.P. in 
France, and obtained after 11 years of schooling): 30- 3% of the sample get such a diploma, 
* the third group corresponds to young men holding at least a high-school diploma 
(more than 12 years of schooling): it represents 9-2% of the subsample, 
* finally, 136 individuals (10- 170/)) gave no information on their education level. 
Figure 2.4 shows the proportions of these four subgroups who were unemployed, 
employed either in a permanent job, a temporary job or a public employment programme 
each month from August 1986 to May 1988 (these proportions are calculated without 
incorporating the individuals having moved to attrition). It is obvious that, for the highly 
educated people, the unemployment rate is lower at the end of this period, while their rate 
of employment in permanent jobs is higher (650/o vs. 30% for the young men with no 
diploma). Now let us consider the proportions in jobs resulting from public employment 
policies: they are higher for young men without a diploma or non-respondents. For young 
men with at least a high-school diploma, the proportion in PEP jobs is around 100/o at 
the end of the observation period. 
One objective of our study is to compare programme effects for different educational 
levels. Consequently, we concentrate the statistical analysis on the most represented strata: 
males without a diploma and males with a technical school certificate satisfying the age 
condition for programme participation.3 Descriptive statistics giving numbers of individual 
transitions over the observation period show that these two groups move more intensively 
between labour force states than the highly educated people. For instance, the maximum 
number of transitions recorded over this period is equal to 1, indicating that young males 
with a low educational level are highly mobile. 
3. To simplify, we keep males who are more than 16 years old in August 1986 and less than 26 in May 
1988. 
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Frequencies of the first three transitions 
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III. MODELLING INDIVIDUAL LABOUR MARKET TRANSITIONS 
111.1. Generalframework and notations 
We suppose that each worker in the population is subject to a participation process4 Y, 
describing his current state in the labour market at time t (t ? 0). Considering the problem 
to be analysed and the specificities of our data set, we assume that the process Y, takes 
its values at any instant t in the discrete state space E= {je N, 1 _j 6}, where the index 
j labels the following states: 
1. unemployment, 
2. employment in a job with an unlimited duration contract (permanent 
employment), 
3. employment in a job with a limited duration contract (temporary employment), 
4. employment in a job resulting from a public employment policy (PEP job), 
5. out-of-labour force state, 
6. attrition state. 
In fact, the survey permits us to distinguish between five kinds of PEP jobs: appren- 
ticeship contracts, adaptation and qualification contracts, community jobs (T.U.C.), initia- 
tion courses (S.I.V.P.), and courses for 16-to-25 year-olds. But considering the small 
numbers of observed transitions, we aggregate the different kinds of PEP jobs into one 
state. The attrition state is an absorbing state which can be reached only after the sampling 
date To (August 1986). The index / is used for indicating the rank order of a spell in any 
individual event history. This index can take a positive or negative integer value: 1=0 
refers necessarily to the unemployment spell sampled at To, /= 1 corresponds to the first 
spell (if any) observed after this sampled unemployment spell, 1= -1 corresponds to the 
spell just preceding this unemployment spell, and so on. Consequently, the maximal value 
taken by / for an individual observation indicates the number of transitions experienced by 
the worker after the sampling date To. Individual participation histories are retrospectively 
observed at times T, (November 1986), T2 (May 1987), T3 (November 1987) and T4 (May 
1988). Any "complete" (without attrition) history is right-censored at T4. A transition to 
attrition may occur at any time between T_, - and T,?, (m = 1, .. ., 4), and not at times 
TO, . . ., T4 exactly. For a worker,5 Tr denotes the random date of entrance into the Ith 
spell of his observed participation history: consequently, Yr, is the state occupied by an 
individual during the lth spell of his history, and U1= ,+- r, is a (positive) random 
variable representing the time spent by the worker in this lth spell. 
In our data set, individuals are sampled in the unemployed population at date T( 
(August 1986): consequently, the worker has already spent a time Uo = To - r( in unem- 
ployment at this date. This sojourn time U0 is obviously an incomplete (right-censored) 
duration: then Ro = Uo - Uo = - To denotes the residual duration of the sampled unem- 
ployment spell ending with a transition to state Yr, at time Tl . 
For simplifying the model, we assume that individual transitions in the labour market 
do not directly depend on calendar time through seasonal or business cycle effects.6 More- 
over they are supposed to be independent of the worker's age. This is mainly for practical 
4. For a general presentation of the econometric treatment of transition data, see for example the textbook 
by Lancaster (1990) or surveys by Florens and Fougere (1992) or Fougere and Kamionka (1992h). 
5. We delete the person-specific index to simplify formulas. 
6. Obviously, this is a strong (and probably unrealistic) assumption: however, Fougerc and Kamionika 
(1992a) found empirical evidence of the relative time-homogeneity of individual transition intensitics over the 
period 1986-1988 in France. For the incorporation of seasonal and business-cycle effects in duration or trainsition 
models, see De Toldi, Gourieroux and Monfort (1995) or Imbens and Lynch (1992). 
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reasons: including age as a covariate in the twenty-five possible transitions would unreason- 
ably expand the already long list of coefficients to be estimated. To some extent, the effects 
of age at entry into the sample will be captured by the unobserved heterogeneity term; 
however, we must recognize that a random term is an imperfect substitute to age.7 
Consequently, the individual time axis may be scaled so that its origin (t = 0) is set 
equal to the date at which a worker enters the labour market for the first time: then r, 
measures the time difference between this entry date (which is observed in the data set) 
and the date at which the individual experiences his lth transition in the labour market. 
As an illustration of the sampling scheme, Figure 3.1 represents a realization of the labour 
market transition process described above. This figure shows that the worker is firstly 
unemployed for a duration U-2 = r_I, then is employed in a temporary job with a duration 
equal to U_I = To- r-I, then enters once again unemployment (where he is sampled at 
date To and surveyed at date T1 ) for a duration equal to Uo = T - To, then finds a job 
under an "adaptation-type" contract whose duration is Ul = T2- T,, and then moves to a 
permanent job in which he stays for a duration greater than U2: this last duration is right- 
censored at date T4 by the end of the observation schedule. 
yt 
6 
5 
T2 
4 
1'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. 
3 - v . 
~~~~~~~~~~~T3 T4 
2 -- ...... *.*...X. 
To T, 
Tr-2- i To Tr I Tr2. 
U-2 U ,1 Uo1 U, 1-- 
FIGURF 3.1 
A realization of the labour market transition process Y, 
111.2. Distribution of the individual transition processes 
Now we assume that individual labour market transitions are governed by intensity 
functions of the mixed proportional hazard (MPH) type (see Elbers and Ridder (1982) 
and Ridder (1990) for the presentation and the identifiability of MPH models applied to 
single-spell duration data, and Flinn and Heckman (1982, 1983), Aalen (1987) and Honore 
7. In less-parameterized versions of the econometric model, we introduced amonig covariates affectinig 
rates of exit from unemployment a dummy variable indicating if the worker's age was greater than 21 years old 
at the beginning of the unemployment spell. Generally, this variable was found to have no statistically significant 
effect. 
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(1993) for extensions of such models to multi-state multi-spell duration data). More 
specifically, we assume that the intensity of transition to state k after a sojourn duration 
equal to ul in state j (ji k), during the /th spell of his labour market transition process, 
is defined by 
hjk(ul I Pjk, Xjk(1, + ul), Vjk) = h(k) (Ul) exp [f3k Xjk(r, + us)] vjk for k =Aj, (1) 
where: 
* hk2( ) is a positive baseline intensity function, whose form may depend on the 
origin (j) and destination (k) states, but not on the rank order (1) of the current 
spell in the transition history, 
* Xjk( * ) is a vector of time-varying individual covariates whose value at the transition 
time (Tr,+ ul) is supposed to affect a move from state j to state k (k #j) through a 
vector of unknown parameters fjk (to be estimated), 
* and Vjk is a positive random variate with c.d.f. Fjk, whose specification may depend 
on states j and k but not on the rank order of the spell, and which is intended to 
capture the effect of individual unobserved heterogeneity on transition from state 
j to state k. 
Given the number of possible transitions, we restrict the size of the multivariate 
random vector (Vjk) by assuming that vjk = Vk, for any jeE, which means that the hetero- 
geneity term affecting the intensity of transition from state j to state k (k #j) is specific 
to the destination state k. This last assumption implies, for example, that an individual 
with a relatively high value for the unobserved component v5 has a loose attachment to 
the labour market and is more likely to move to the non-participation state, whatever the 
state (employment or unemployment) he currently occupies. Alternatively, an unskilled 
or disadvantaged worker should have much more willingness to accept subsidized course- 
type jobs or training programmes and so have a higher value for the unobserved component 
V4. 
The vector of time-varying covariates Xjk() can be decomposed into two sub-vectors 
Xjk(Ti) and Xjk(1 + ul): 
* the value of the first one Xi?k(,r) is fixed at the date of entrance into the Ith spell 
and then remains constant through the spell: typically, this vector includes time- 
independent covariates and also covariates describing the past individual history 
in the labour market (number of previous spells of unemployment, total sojourn 
duration in these spells, last state occupied, . . .); 
* the second sub-vector of covariates Xjk( rl+ul) incorporates covariates varying 
through the Ith spell; in our application, we consider exclusively one such covariate: 
an indicator process Z(r,l+ul) taking the value one if the state occupied by the 
individual during the lth spell of his transition process is unemployment and if he 
is still receiving unemployment insurance benefits after a time ul spent in this spell, 
the value zero otherwise. However, the survey does not give any information on 
the amount of these benefits and on the duration of the period of qualification to 
receive unemployment insurance. 
Using assumptions made on Xjk, the transition intensity (1) may be written 
hjk(ul I Pjk, Xjk( ,r + u,), Vk )= hJk) (u/) exp [P/k X0 (TI) + Y4Z(r +u, )] VA, (2) 
where 
f1k=(I31k, Xjk Y, Xjk (t/ + Ul) [Xjk (r ), Z( T + Ul )], 
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and 
I if uj:<Di, 
Z(T+ l) t elsewhere. 
D, is the potential duration of qualification for unemployment insurance benefits during 
the Ith spell if this spell is an unemployment spell, i.e. j= 1 (if j # 1, D, is necessarily 
equal to zero and Z(r,+ u,) is constantly zero through the Ith spell). Consequently, the 
conditional density function (3) of the duration in state j during the Ith spell, given that 
this spell starts at time r, and ends at time r,+ u, with a transition to state k, is (see 
Fougere and Kamionka (1992b, pp. 474-475) for a proof) 
gjk(Ul1f3],Xi(T/+ U,), V) =hjk(U IPjk,Xjk( rT+ U,), Vk) 
xp ( TUK hjk(t I Pjk', Xjk'(rl+ t), Vk)dt) 
0~~~~~ 
=h(k) (ul) exp [,yjkZ(,ri + Ul ) + 0kXjk (TI )] Vk 
x (exp (Yjkk) j h(k (t)dt+ h(2?(t)dt)}), (3) 
0 
where the vectors f, X ( X?) and v are defined by k =[l jkx]k j,XkXj( )=[Xk(X)]k , v= 
[Vk ]keE, and where K= 6 if transitions to attrition state are allowed, K= 5 otherwise. The 
conditional density function defined in (3) is the likelihood contribution of the /th spell 
when it is not right-censored (i.e. when Z ,+ u= r,+ep u h4). When the /th spell ends after 
7'4, the contribution of this right-censored spell to the likelihood function is 
Sj(T4-r,Ir,, fl1,X1(T4), V) 
=prob (u,> T4-r,Ir, fl1,X1(T4), V) 
( 1 Tk=ix h(tll jk'Xjk'(T,+t) Vk)dt)( 
o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
where S1( I ) is the conditional survival function of the duration in stateo. If an individual 
moves to the attrition state during the /th spell between two successive interview dates 
Tm-i and Tm (m = 1,.. ., 4), then the contribution of this spell to the likelihood function 
iS 
Sjo (e]Tm- l-TI 'l Tm-j, Xj (T4 Yr- V)pX n1 ,v 
= S p(Tm- il >Tl, fly, Xj(Tm l ), v)-S1(T,,, - nl r,, 13, X,(T,,1 ), v). (5) 
However some difficulty may appear in the treatment of transitions towards the attrition 
state. In fact, suppose an individual is observed to leave the panel between two consecutive 
interviews. The model states that there is a positive probability that the individual makes 
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one or more labour market transitions between the last interview at which he participated 
and the moment at which the duration of panel survey participation is completed. Past 
states should affect the exit rate out of the panel, so every time a transition is made, the 
exit rate out of the panel should change. The easiest way to avoid this difficulty is to make 
the exit rates out of the panel independent of past labour market states.8 
111.3. Correction of the stock sampling bias 
It is well known that sampling from the stock of unemployed people at a given date To 
may induce biased estimates for parameters of the distribution of durations in that state 
or in subsequent states (employment, out-of-labour force, etc.). The bias has two compo- 
nents: firstly, a length-bias due to the fact that the sampling probability of a given spell 
is generally proportional to its elapsed duration (or length), and secondly, an inflow-rate 
bias, resulting from the dependence of this probability on the rate of transition into 
unemployment at the starting date To of that spell.9 
Like other data sets used in similar studies (see, for example, Ridder (1986), Van den 
Berg, Lindeboom and Ridder (1994)), the INSEE survey does not register the individual 
transition history Q(T0) preceding the entry into the unemployment spell sampled at To, 
with the exception of the information on the state occupied just before entering this 
unemployment spell. For circumventing this problem, one way is to assume that the entry 
rate into unemployment does not depend directly on the calendar time, but factorizes in 
terms of v, (the unobserved heterogeneity term affecting the intensities of transition 
towards unemployment) and X(T0), which denotes the vector of individual covariates at 
the time of entry into unemployment (see Van den Berg, Lindeboom and Ridder (1994, 
p. 424)). In other terms, if q( j ) denotes the inflow rate, then we assume that 
q(ro I v, X(ro)) = q, (v ) X q2 (X(To )) Cv X q2 (X(TO)) (6) 
with ql ( ) >0 and q2 (' ) > 0. Recalling that U0 = To - To denotes the time already spent in 
unemployment by an individual at the sampling date, then the probability that an indi- 
vidual with a given unobserved heterogeneity term v and a given covariate vector X(To) 
is in the stock of unemployed people at To equals 
rr 
Ps(V vX(ro)) q(lo I v, X(ro)) prob (U0 > Uo I v, X(ro))dUo 
0 
o~~~~~~~~~~~u 
OCV, x q2 (X(r)) x { exp {-Z2 hlk(tI flkV Xlk(TA Vk)dt}dUo. 
Consequently, the probability to be sampled in the stock given the observable heterogeneity 
only is 
.PAX(To))= i PF(v, X(To))f(vIa)dv, (8) 
vc-A 
8. We thank a referee for this suggestion. 
9. Papers by Ridder (1984), Van den Berg, Lindeboom and Ridder (1994) and Gourieroux and Monfort 
(1992) develop statistical analysis of such biases in the context of unemployment duration models. 
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where f( I a) is the joint density function of the vector v and A is the support of the 
distribution of v. Finally, the likelihood contribution of an individual with covariates 
X(ro) at entry and with observed transition history (r,, YT,),=0,,I,...,L is the conditional 
density of this sequence given that the individual was in the unemployment stock at date 
TO, L= 0, 1, 2, . . . being the number of transitions observed for this individual before T4. 
So this likelihood function has the general form 
?((r,, Yr,),=o, l..,rLX(ro), ,B, a) 
= L[ q(ro v1 I X(ro))Sy.(T4-L,( Ty, Xj(T4), V) 
vc-A 
x {ILJuogY l- I yl(i, XIf I XY,I(r_Ii +uI-), v)}f(vla)dv x [Pl(X(ro)] 
X [ VI x SYI (T-rL IYLz Xi (T4 ) V) 
x= {Io 9Y/- I, l(ul- I pYi- IXY'- ('rl- I + ul- IV) f)}(v I a)dv] 
LI V (T exp { =2jX hIk(tIflIk,XIk( To), Vk)dt}dUo)of(vla)dvl , (9) 
where Y, is the state occupied during the Ith spell of the observed transition history. Given 
formulas (2), (3) and (4), a standard maximum likelihood procedure allows to obtain 
consistent estimates of ,B = (1ik )k #1, of parameters of baseline hazard functions hlj'k and 
of parameters a of the joint density f() of the vector v. 
111.4. Specification issues 
Besides the introduction of a time-varying unemployment benefits entitlement variable, 
we allow the baseline rates of transition from unemployment o permanent or temporary 
employment and to PEP jobs to be piecewise constant. More precisely, we assume that 
hk0 (u) = exp (8ok) if u ? 6 months, 
=exp (Sok + 2k ) if 6 < u 12 months, for k = 2, 3, 4. (10) 
= exp (ok + 63k ) if u > 12 months, 
This specification allows for possible non-monotone evolutions of the exit rates from 
unemployment, without increasing dramatically the number of parameters. All other tran- 
sition intensities are supposed to be constant through time. For the distribution of the 
unobserved heterogeneity vector v = ( Vk )k= I.,K, we consider two alternative assumptions. 
Firstly, following Flinn and Heckman (1982), we assume that components ( Vk )k I... K are 
generated by a common normally distributed random variate w such as 
vk=exp(akw), (11) 
where w-IX(0, 1). 
Obviously, this specification allows unobserved explanatory variables Vk to be mutu- 
ally dependent. However, this dependence is too restrictive, because correlation between 
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log Vk and log Vk (k'A k) can only equal 0, 1 or -1, according to the fact that akak = 0, 
akak>0 or akak'<O. A way of producing more flexible dependence is to assume that 
components Vk have discrete multivariate distributions with a finite number of points of 
support. For instance, Van den Berg (1995) examines the range of values that correlation 
of the duration variables can attain in bivariate mixed proportional hazard models. It 
turns out that when the bivariate vector of unobserved heterogeneity terms has a bivariate 
discrete distribution with two or more points of support for each component, and the 
locations of these points are not fixed in advance, then all possible values can be reached. 
On the other hand, when this vector has a log-normal distribution, then the range of 
values that can be attained is smaller. 
In our model, a six-dimensional discrete distribution would be burdensome, but it is 
still possible to estimate without too much computational difficulty a two-factor loading 
model in which 
vk= exp (aklWl + ak2W2), (12) 
and 
prob { (w,, w2 )= (w , w21)} =p, 
=(W12, W21 )}=p2, 
=(WI 1, W22)} =p3, 
=(W12, W22)} = 1 -PI P2P3, 
wij E R, i,j= 1, 2. 
For this second model, we have to estimate K couples (akl, ak2) of parameters, four points 
of support wij and three probabilities of the form 
expP(iu) i= 1, 2,3. (13) 
l + = exp (pi) 
The test for model selection developed by Vuong (1989) may be used here as a criterion 
of choice between the two alternative models ( 11) and (1 2). These two models are overlap- 
ping and their intersection is the model without unobserved heterogeneity. Consequently, 
the selection test is the two stage sequential test proposed by Vuong (1989, p. 321). 
IV. RESULTS 
As explained in Section III, the different public measures are aggregated into one state, 
called "public employment programmes" (PEP). So the statistical model allows for transi- 
tions among six states, which are unemployment (U), regular employment with an unlim- 
ited duration labour contract (UDC), temporary employment with a limited duration 
labour contract (LDC), employment in a public employment programme (PEP), out-of- 
labour force (OLF), and attrition (A).'0 Here we consider strata composed of men who 
were less than 26 years old in November 1986 and who get either a technical school 
certificate or no diploma at all. Table 4.1 contains parameters estimates of models (I ) 
10. In the subsample of young men holding a technical school certificate, attrition state is omitted because 
of the small number of concerned transitions; transitions towards the attrition state are treated as right-censored 
spells. 
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and (12) (denoted models A and B, respectively) with individual heterogeneity and correc- 
tion of the stock sampling bias. Covariate vectors include a time-varying variable indicating 
if the individual is qualified for the unemployment insurance (UI) system during each 
month of the unemployment spell, and also dichotomous variables indicating the state 
occupied just before entering the current state. Among previous states, we make the 
distinction between four types of employment programmes: 
* qualification, adaptation or apprenticeship contracts, 
* public interest jobs (TUC). 
* courses for preparation to the working life, 
* other courses. 
IV. 1. Transition intensities 
The results show that the previous occurrence of a public employment programme affects 
only some transition intensities. The sign and the magnitude of the statistically significant 
effects depend on the type of programme which has been previously followed. Introducing 
unobserved heterogeneity terms improves the adequacy of the models." The result of the 
Vuong test for model selection is inconclusive: models (11) and (12) cannot be discrimi- 
nated given the data. Generally, parameter estimates do not vary much from one model 
to the other. However, they differ significantly for some variables of interest.'2 Let us first 
comment upon the results which are stable. The impact of programmes on subsequent 
unemployment durations depends crucially on the educational level. For young men 
without a diploma (the least educated group), the previous occurrence of an appren- 
ticeship, qualification or adaptation contract induces a higher intensity of transition from 
unemployment to regular (UDC) jobs, while it has no effect on the same transition for 
young men with a professional education level. At the same time, the experience of a 
community job in the public sector (TUC) has no effect on the intensity of transition from 
unemployment to regular or temporary employment for the sample without a diploma, 
while it decreases significantly this transition intensity for young men with a professional 
or technical diploma. In a sense, these results provide a first criterion for ranking different 
public employment programmes. Obviously, whatever the educational level is, training 
programmes in the private sector (respectively, in the public sector) have the most favour- 
able (respectively, the poorest) impact on unemployment outcomes. Programmes involving 
a higher level of on-the-job training, such as apprenticeship or qualification contracts, are 
essentially beneficial to the less educated young people, who may increase their human 
capital and work experience through these programmes. In contrast, for more educated 
young men, programmes in the public sector (TUC jobs) decrease the intensity of transition 
from the subsequent unemployment spell to regular employment: one possible explanation 
of this result is that participation in such programmes may act as a signal of low employ- 
ment performance, especially for young people who have initially received some profes- 
sional education.'3 Another noticeable result is the high degree of state recurrence, in spite 
11. Parameter estimates for the model without unobserved heterogeneity are not presented here. For each 
model with unobserved heterogeneity, a likelihood ratio test leads to the strong rejection of the nested model 
without unobserved heterogeneity. 
12. This fact confirms the results of Heckman and Singer (1984) who gave evidence on the sensitivity of 
parameter estimates obtained from econometric models for single duration data to assumed functional forms 
for the distribution of unobserved variables. 
13. This result was also found by Gritz (1993), but with a relatively small number of government trainees 
and without distinguishing between different levels of education. 
702 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 
TABLE 4.1 (beginning) 
Transition intensitiesfrom unemployment 
Young men without Young men with a 
any diploma (N= 672) technical school certificate (N=405) 
Variables Model A Model B Model A Model B 
U--UDC 
Intercept -4i269 (09489) -4i299 (0 098) -4i115 (0 674) -3i888 (0i124) 
Intercept 6-12 months -0 506 (0i140) -0 490 (0i100) -0-126 (0-120) -0 080 (0-120) 
Intercept >12 months -0i363 (0i171) -0i319 (0 093) -0 044 (0 067) 0 250 (0d119) 
Qualification for UI 0-047 (0 438) -0 255 (0 098) 0 300 (0 754) 0-138 (0-124) 
Previous occurrence of: 
QC, AC, App 0 979 (0 606) 1P606 (0i120) -0-264 (1-221) -0 059 (0- 156) 
TUC -0-120 (0-390) 0-000 (0-116) -0 753 (0 360) -0i746 (0i152) 
SIVP 0*485 (0239) 0i840 (0i117) 0-493 (0-343) 0i416(0i147) 
Other courses 0 300 (0 339) 0 538 (0i113) 0-045 (0-494) -0-190 (0-150) 
UDC 0i902 (0i151) 0i922 (0 093) 0i386 (0i201) 0i389 (0i118) 
LDC 0 403 (0i186) 0 405 (0 094) 0 334 (0 200) 0i341 (0i114) 
U-+LDC 
Intercept -3i343 (0i813) -3i107 (0i101) -3i445 (0 333) -3i658 (0i131) 
Intercept 6-12 months -0-151 (0 209) -0i197 (0 094) -0-011 (0 203) -0-113 (0-113) 
Intercept >12 months -0i411 (0i178) -0i446 (0 095) 0 069 (0-175) -0 077 (0-125) 
Qualification for UI -0i912 (0i461) -1P275 (O101) -0-134 (0 276) -0-178 (0-127) 
Previous occurrence of: 
QC, AC, App 0-167 (1-065) 0i383 (0i121) -0-752 (0-914) 0-032 (0-157) 
TUC 0-131 (0-219) 0-086 (0-114) -0i772 (0 343) -0i828 (0i152) 
SIVP 1.010 (0i315) 0*718 (0*116) 0-227 (0-559) 0i371 (0i148) 
Other courses -0-255 (0 397) -0-186 (0-116) 0 855 (0 587) 1P360 (0i149) 
UDC -0*363 (0.131) -0i386 (0.101) 0-165 (0-148) 0-152 (0-124) 
LDC 0 537 (0i160) 0i523 (0 089) 0i660 (0i156) 0 750 (0i108) 
U-PEP 
Intercept -4i619 (0 792) -4i844 (0i100) -3 257 (0 727) -3 074 (0i123) 
Intercept 6-12 months -0-006 (0-161) 0-066 (0 096) -0 303 (0-230) -0i328 (0i132) 
Intercept >12 months 0 088 (0-191) 0i223 (0 092) 0-153 (0-145) 0-221 (0 126) 
Qualification for UI 0-688 (0 704) 0i766 (0 099) -0-521 (0- 696) -0i664 (0i123) 
Previous occurrence of: 
QC, AC, App 1P229 (0i362) 0i795 (Od118) 0 359 (0 749) 0i663 (0i155) 
TUC 0i912 (0 078) 0i877 (0i108) 1P334 (0 380) 1P280 (0d139) 
SIVP 0 805 (0K330) 0i610 (0i115) 1i123 (0i181) 1i130 (0i144) 
Other courses 0-294 (0-317) 0-160 (0-111) 0 853 (0 229) 0i633 (0d148) 
UDC -0i420 (0i134) -0 458 (0i101) -0-417 (0 344) -0 440 (0i133) 
LDC -0 205 (0-126) -0i186 (0 094) -0 528 (0 234) -0i489 (0i126) 
U- OLF 
Intercept -4 003 (0 888) -3i777 (0i117) 
Qualification for UI 1-477 (1-001) 1-369 (0-117) 
U-A 
Intercept -4i421 (1i182) -4i921 (0i104) 
Qualification for UI -0 544 (1 210) -0 403 (0i104) 
of the introduction of time-constant unobserved heterogeneity into the model. For 
example, the previous experience of a regular job just before the entry into the current 
unemployment spell increases the probability of transition to another regular job at the 
end of the current unemployment spell. The same recurrence effects appear for temporary 
jobs and youth employment programmes. With these data and with this reduced-form 
model, it is difficult to know if these recurrence effects are mainly due to workers' prefer- 
ences or to the selection carried out by employers during the hiring process: nevertheless, 
they could be compatible with a segmented labour market in which past employment 
histories provide information on applicants to future employers, and which may result, 
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TABLE 4.1 (intermediate) 
Transition intensities from regular and temporary jobs 
Young men without Young men with a 
any diploma (N= 672) technical school certificate (N=405) 
Variables Model A Model B Model A Model B 
UDC-U 
Intercept -3 003 (0-117) -2-227 (0 086) -3-266 (0-061) -3-259 (0-105) 
Previous occurrence of: 
SIVP -0 363 (0 591) -0 777 (0-119) -0 836 (1079) -0 672 (0 155) 
Other PEP jobs 0 320 (0 317) -0 050 (0 114) 0-828 (0-210) 0-877 (0-142) 
LDC 0 119 (0 446) 0 176 (0 108) -0 437 (0 355) -0-588 (0d140) 
UDC--LDC 
Intercept -3-966 (0117) -4-277 (0-103) -4-078 (0-138) -4 057 (0-135) 
Previous occurrence of: 
PEiP jobs -1240 (0 653) -1P513 (0-120) 
LDC -2*210 (0 365) -1-738 (0-119) -0-438 (0-136) -1P041 (0-145) 
UDC-4PEP 
Intercept -4-556 (0-162) -4-179 (0-108) -4-510 (0 363) -4 750 (0-136) 
Previous occurrence of: 
PEP jobs 0 583 (0 671) 0 097 (0 118) 
LDC -1131 (1087) -0 894 (0 154) 
UDC-- OLF: Intercept -5-992 (0 482) -6-280 (0-118) -5-321 (0 249) -5-422 (0d143) 
UDC->A: Intercept -4-406 (0-219) -4 500 (0-109) 
LDC- U 
Intercept -1P625 (0 265) -1P636 (0 080) -1P891 (0d120) -2d146 (0 095) 
Previous occurrence of: 
PEP -0*936 (0 485) -1 084 (0-117) -1P462 (0 278) -1P319 (0-153) 
UDC -0-663 (0-211) -0-430 (0-110) -0 363 (0 219) -0 226 (0 141) 
LDC-- UDC 
Intercept -2-625 (0 288) -3-017 (0 093) -2-447 (0d155) -2-288 (0-106) 
Previous occurrence of: 
PEP -1115 (0 703) -1 056 (0d120) 0-038 (0 391) -0-367 (0-151) 
UDC -0 643 (0 329) -0-810 (0-115) 0 169 (0 358) -0 087 (0 143) 
LDC- PEP 
Intercept -4-663 (0-367) -4-753 (0114) -4-213 (0 300) -3-962 (0d133) 
Previous occurrence of: 
PEP 1-854 (0 497) 1P702 (0-119) 0 995 (0-515) 0-881 (0d152) 
LDC-+OLF: Intercept -4-813 (0 579) -4-614 (0-117) -4-789 (0 263) -4-695 (0d143) 
LDC-?A: Intercept -4d139 (0 286) -4-096 (0d 14) 
through this signalling process, in the confining of workers with different productive 
abilities in different types of jobs. 
The results concerning transitions from regular (UDC) jobs reveal that, for young 
people with a technical school certificate, the previous occurrence of a programme in the 
public sector with neither formal nor specific training is related to a higher intensity of 
transition from regular employment to unemployment than other types of programmes 
(namely, SIVP and apprenticeship, qualification or adaptation contracts): this result may 
be explained by the fact that regular jobs offered by employers to young people after a 
training period in the firm have better attributes than the ones offered to young people 
having just experienced a programme in the public sector, and so that they generate better 
matches and longer subsequent employment durations. Moreover, a young worker with 
no experience who was previously in a programme (whatever its type) or in a temporary 
job and who is currently employed in a regular job moves less frequently to a temporary 
job than if he was previously unemployed. 
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TABLE 4.1 (end) 
Transition intensities from PEP and OLF states 
Young men without Young men with a 
any diploma (N= 672) technical school certificate (N=405) 
Variables Model A Model B Model A Model B 
PEP-+ U: Intercept -2-424 (0 044) -2-668 (0 080) -2-532 (0-139) -2 594 (0-108) 
PEP-- UDC: Intercept -3 394 (0-210) -3-368 (0 098) -3 094 (0 068) -3-232 (0d121) 
PEP-?LDC: Intercept -4-501 (0 652) -4-766 (0-111) -4-290 (0 455) -4K328 (0d141) 
PEP -?OLF: Intercept -5-010 (0 537) -5-976 (0-116) -4-287 (0 286) -4-295 (0-141) 
PEP-+A: Intercept -4 494 (0-371) -4-612 (0-109) 
OLF-+ U: Intercept -2-944 (0 094) -2-958 (0-100) -2-943 (0 086) -3 033 (0-133) 
OLF-+ UDC: Intercept -5-018 (0 262) -5-278 (0-118) -4-535 (0 353) -4-756 (0-150) 
OLD--LDC: Intercept -5-567 (0 702) -5-789 (0-119) -5-223 (0 577) -5-572 (0-152) 
OLF-+PEP: Intercept -4 557 (0 454) -4-671 (0-116) -4-810 (0-399) -4-971 (0-152) 
OLF-?A: Intercept -4 985 (0 283) -5-348 (0-117) 
a, -0 067 (0 263) -0 021 (0 126) 
a2 -0-203 (0-311) 0 234 (0-170) 
a3 -0-889 (0 078) -1P016 (0 079) 
a4 0-316 (0 499) -0 253 (0 261) 
a5 0-215 (0 641) -0 244 (0-107) 
a6 0-682 (0 350) 
all -0 592 (0 084) 0-259 (0 075) 
a21 0-258 (0 079) -0 114 (0 084) 
a3l -0 357 (0 090) -1P794 (0-139) 
a4l -0-875 (0-107) -0-302 (0 098) 
a5l -2-199 (0-119) -0-561 (0 076) 
a6l 0 453 (0 094) 
a] 2 0-041 (0 062) -0-694 (0 104) 
a22 --0-682 (0 087) 0 645 (0-106) 
a32 -1P276 (0-104) 0 730 (0-121) 
a42 0 404 (0 083) 0-656 (0-118) 
a52 0-155 (0 114) 0-808 (0 099) 
a62 0 944 (0-104) 
pi -0-319 (0-109) --0*467 (0-137) 
/2 -0-680 (0.112) -0 499 (0-149) 
/3 0K346 (0-112) -4*244 (0-150) 
coI1 -0-491 (0 070) -0 799 (0 099) 
(,12 1 592 (0-117) 1 550 (0-142) 
(021 -0-883 (0 080) -0-741 (0-105) 
C022 0-962 (0-101) 1-077 (0-120) 
Log-likelihood -10,536 76 -10,519 93 -5807 58 -5790 77 
Notes. Meaning of abbreviations for Table 4.1: QC, AC, App: Qualification Contract, Adaptation Contract, 
or Apprenticeship Contract. 
Remark. In Table 4.1, figures between brackets are standard deviations. Bold type style indicates a 5% signifi- 
cance level while italic type style means a 10% one. 
Baseline piecewise-constant intensities of transition from unemployment are not much 
modified when the distributional assumption on the unobserved heterogeneity terms 
changes. Intensities of transition from unemployment to regular employment or to tempor- 
ary employment are decreasing for young men with a very low educational level, while 
they are constant for young men having a professional diploma. For this last group and 
at that time (1986-1988), long-term unemployment did not reduce the chances of getting 
a regular (or a temporary) job: from this viewpoint, long-term unemployment was only 
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unfavourable to the least-educated young workers. Under assumption (11), i.e. when the 
individual random effects are supposed to be log-normally distributed, the intensity of 
transition from unemployment to training programmes is constant through the unemploy- 
ment spell. However, when these random effects are assumed to have a bivariate discrete 
distribution with two points of support (model B), this transition intensity increases slightly 
after twelve months: this could be due to a decline of the reservation wage which makes 
training programmes more acceptable over a longer period of unemployment, or to the 
fact that subsidized jobs in the public sector (community jobs, for example) are more 
frequently offered to long-term unemployed people. 
Finally, the estimated effects of the time-varying covariate indicating qualification for 
the UI system through the unemployment spell is sensitive to the distributional assumption 
concerning unobserved heterogeneity, except in the case of the intensity of transition from 
unemployment to temporary employment which is lower for low-educated young workers 
before time of benefit exhaustion.14 In general, qualification for UI has no effect or a 
negative effect on the rates of exit from unemployment. However, when young unemployed 
men with no educational diploma are still qualified for the UI system, they are transiting 
more intensively to programmes (the corresponding estimating parameter is significant 
with model B). This last result could be due to an incentive effect resulting from the 
legislation concerning eligibility rights to the UI system. More precisely, when an unem- 
ployed young worker qualified for UI accept to enter into a programme, the UI payment 
is interrupted during the programme, but the worker keeps his remaining rights to UI if 
he re-enters unemployment at the end of the programme. 
In model A, most of the estimates of parameters ak associated with the unobserved 
Gaussian heterogeneity term are not significantly different from zero: according to this 
model, selection into programmes does not depend on unobservable covariates. On the 
contrary, estimates of parameters akj in model B imply that unobservables have significant 
effects on programme entry. More precisely, estimates of correlations between random 
heterogeneity terms show that selection into programmes is "negative" for young men 
without any diploma: this means that, in this subgroup, individuals who are unexpectedly 
likely to enter programmes are also unexpectedly likely to enter unemployment. At the 
opposite, selection is "positive" for young men holding a technical school certificate: here, 
individuals who are unexpectedly likely to enter programmes are also unexpectedly likely 
to be hired in permanent jobs. 
IV.2. Some useful indicators 
Estimated transition intensities may be used to calculate some summary indicators of the 
magnitude of programme effects. We concentrate here on the conditional probability that 
some state k directly follows statej (k #Aj) and on the conditional probability of becoming 
long-term unemployed, given that a programme has been previously experienced. Given 
the importance of the self-selection issue in assessing the effects of training programmes, 
we report estimates of these conditional probabilities after elimination of the effects of 
unobserved heterogeneity on transitions towards the programmes. For that purpose, we 
calculate these indicators as expectations of conditional probabilities over the uncondi- 
tional distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity. Under the assumptions of the model, 
14. This result could be explained by a change in the search behaviour of low-educated young workers 
through their unemployment spell: once they are no more qualified for the UI system, they could be more 
disposed to accept temporary jobs, which are more frequent but often associated with lower wages. 
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these expectations may be viewed as the conceptual equivalent of random assignment to 
the different programmes. 
When covariates do not vary during the lth spell in statej, the conditional probability 
that state k follows state j (k #j), given the value X(Tr) of individual covariates at time 
T,/ of entry into the current spell in state j, is equal to 
flklj(X(T))={ IIkj(X(t,), w)f(w)dw, (14) 
where 
+co 
F1k1j(X(Tr), w)=J hjk(uIX(7,), w)Sj(uIX(ir,), w)du. (15) 
0 
In equation (14), W (respectively, f) denotes the support of the distribution (respectively, 
the density function) of the random heterogeneity term w. When w has a discrete distribu- 
tion, the integral in equation (14) is substituted for a simple sum over the points of support 
of w. If the origin state j is different from unemployment (j #1), the assumption of time- 
constant baseline transition intensities implies that 
1kl1(X(Tl), w)= h1k(X(,), ) j) l. (16) 
Zk,,j hjk,(X(-17), w)' ]1 
If the origin state is unemployment (j= 1), assumption (10) implies that 
FIkIl(X(r,), w)- L lthSQ) [1-exp {-6Ek'+ l h(k(li 
Zk, - h[Ie? [l-exp {-6 h} { h 
h lk___ (1) 
+- (2o) exp {-6 k1 h [1 -exp {-6 k2 17 
Ek'61 hlk' 
+ hklhk -6 (h(d2 + h?(2) }, (17) 
where 
h(k =exp (6Ok+5lk+ P/kX(lrl))Vk, 1=1, 2, 3, (18) 
with 1k -0 for identification, Vk being alternatively defined by equations (11) and (12). 
These probabilities are calculated by using ML parameter estimates of the models (11) 
and (12) for unemployed workers not qualified for the UI system and for workers currently 
occupied in a regular job. In the case of an unemployed worker who is eligible to the UI 
system, we have to consider the potential duration T of his eligibility period. For instance, 
in 1986 in France, if an unemployed worker was employed between 3 and 6 months, 6 
and 12 months or more than 12 months during the year preceding his entry into unemploy- 
ment, the length of his UI elegibility period was 3, 8 and 14 months, respectively. People 
who were previously employed in a community (TUC) job were generally not qualified 
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for UI once they re-entered unemployment. For example, when the eligibility period is 
greater than 12 months (for instance, T= 14 months), the conditional probability that a 
spell in state k follows directly the current spell of unemployment is equal to 
HkIl(X(Iv), T, w)= [Ih-exp 6*k h( )*}] 
I h2] exp {-6 Ek'Z 
I k' 
+ hL-2 k 2k ( e( k$1 
x 
[1-ehp*] x-p Ek{o-6 
h*[ I xik }i + [hlk''$ ~ *) 
>1$ [hlk ] exp{-6Z (h('* +h2) 
k' 3 (2)) ( 
x+[I -[h] -exp {-612) (hk1 +h -12) Zk'$i h(*}' 
where 
h -) = exp (6ok+ 6lk+ fikX(Tl) + Ylk)Vk, 1= 1, 2, 3, (19) 
h(') being defined in (18). Calculations of these probabilities for 0< T? 6 and 6 < T? 12 
are not reproduced here. 
Moreover, the probability of becoming long-term unemployed (i.e. to be unemployed 
for a period greater than 12 months) given the length T of the UI eligibility period is 
equal to 
Si (12 1 X(T,), T) = SI (12 1 X(T,), T, w)f(x)dw, (20) 
wE W 
where 
SI (12 I X(r,), T, w) = exp {-6 Ek$ 1 (h( )* + h(*2)}, if T> 12, 
= exp {-Eke'$ 1 [6h )* + (T- 6)h 2)*+ (12- T)h 2k]}, if 6 < T< 12, 
=exp{ 
-ZkO$ I Iif0k<TI6 
=~~~~ ep{Eo Th(k * + (6 -T)h( ) + 6h (2) ],if 0 < T_ 6, 
h(' and h(')* being defined in (18) and (19), respectively. 
Tables 4.2.a and 4.2.b show that these indicators are very sensitive to the distributional 
assumption on the unobserved heterogeneity terms. For the subsample of young men with 
a low level of education, the choice of a bivariate discrete distribution (model B) results 
in a much higher (respectively, lower) estimate of the expected probability of moving to 
a permanent job (respectively, to another training programme) at the end of the unemploy- 
ment spell which follows participation to a training programme. However, the estimate 
of the expected probability of becoming long-term unemployed is not as sensitive to this 
specification assumption. For the young male subsample with a technical school certificate, 
the results are strictly different: the estimate of the expected probability of becoming long- 
term unemployed is more sensitive to the assumption concerning unobserved components 
than the estimates of the expected probabilities of transition from unemployment to other 
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TABLE 4.2.a 
Probability of unemployment outcomes according to the state previously occupied 
(percentages) 
Young men without a diploma 
First Other QC, AC, 
Previous state entry TUC PEP SIVP LDC App UDC 
Potential duration of UI 
eligibility (in months) 0 0 3 8 3 8 3 8 8 14 8 14 
Probability of transition to 
UDC 
Model without heterogeneity 16-5 12-4 25-0 25-2 17 0 17-8 18-1 204 25-6 24-7 43-1 43.9 
ModelA 17-5 104 211 22-2 13-8 15-1 18-6 20-6 24-9 25-1 403 41-7 
ModelB 19-0 17-1 31 8 33-8 27-3 29-9 224 25-0 50 1 51-3 462 48-2 
LDC 
Model without heterogeneity 59 7 48-4 35-7 29-7 50 0 40 3 64-7 57-4 17-2 14-0 31-4 27-4 
Model A 46-1 43 0 37-8 29-4 51-1 43-8 50 9 45 9 21-9 18 5 25-6 22 4 
Model B 47 0 45-8 33-6 28-9 43-1 36-8 48-2 43 0 20-3 17-3 22-8 19 6 
PEP 
Model without heterogeneity 11-5 28-5 24-7 30-6 25-2 33 9 8-8 12 7 49-8 55-4 12-7 15-2 
Model A 16 7 29 4 24-7 29-8 24-1 31-1 12-8 15-5 44-5 49-1 14 8 17 1 
Model B 8-7 15-0 11-8 14 9 12-6 16-5 7-8 20-2 16-9 19 2 8-9 10-6 
prob (Unemp > one year) 
Model without heterogeneity 35 9 32-6 44-2 45-7 23-2 26-4 24-4 32-0 23-4 21-4 42-3 44 8 
Model A 45 2 30 8 40 7 43 0 17 8 20 7 31-4 36-7 20 7 20 6 43-5 46-1 
Model B 34-3 29-8 35-5 41-9 20 8 26-2 28-3 36-1 19-5 22-8 41-2 46 6 
TABLE 4.2.b 
Probability of unemployment outcomes according to the state previously occupied 
(percentages) 
Young men with a technical school certificate 
First Other QC, AC, 
Previous state entry TUC PEP SIVP LDC App UDC 
Potential duration of UI 
eligibility (in months) 0 0 3 8 3 8 3 8 8 14 8 14 
Probability of transition to 
UDC 
Model without heterogeneity 12 2 3 8 10 9 12-7 14 0 16 4 14 2 16 2 12 2 12 7 22 4 23 0 
Model A 16 5 4-5 10-5 11-1 15-7 16-6 19 5 18-9 12-6 126 21 8 21 5 
Model B 19-1 5-0 9 7 9 8 15 3 16 1 23-1 214 13 2 13 2 23 9 22 9 
LDC 
Model without heterogeneity 42 2 11 6 33 5 27 7 23 5 19.5 52 5 42 7 14 3 12 4 26 1 22 8 
Model A 33-1 10 0 354 33-1 20-7 194 41-8 36-3 13-2 12-2 27-0 25-1 
ModelB 273 88 379 368 194 18-7 322 296 173 168 210 200 
PEP 
Model without heterogeneity 30-1 74-3 33 3 27 8 41 9 34 9 23 2 8 3 32 6 27 9 12 6 10-8 
ModelA 33-8 75-4 32 5 26-2 41-8 33-8 12-6 9 5 314 26-6 12 5 10-5 
Model B 35.9 75.3 27-9 22 1 39 3 32-2 17 8 10 1 28 8 25 4 11 7 9 6 
prob (Unemp> one year) 
Modelwithoutheterogeneity 217 114 10 1 107 7-4 8 1 11-6 116 21-6 19-3 187 162 
Model A 28-7 13-9 11-2 9 9 10-3 9-2 19-6 15-3 22-4 18-8 18-2 14-7 
ModelB 188 73 7.3 6-7 50 5 1 136 106 10 1 90 125 10 1 
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states. In spite of the high sensitivity of estimates, it appears that the estimates of these 
expected probabilities vary significantly with the types of programmes previously experi- 
enced. For example, for young men without any diploma, the expected probability of 
becoming long-term unemployed for the ones who were previously participating to a 
"workplace" training programme (like a qualification, adaptation or apprenticeship con- 
tract) is half of the same probability calculated for the ones who were previously par- 
ticipating "courses for the 16-to-25 years old" (called "other PEP" in Tables 4.2) or who 
enter the labour market for the first time. The efficiency of workplace programmes in the 
private sector is strengthened by the fact that, for the low-educated people, the expected 
probability of getting a permanent (UDC) job at the end of the current unemployment 
spell is much higher if they were previously participating to workplace programmes: on 
the contrary, this probability is low when they enter the labour market for the first time 
or when they were previously employed in community jobs (TUC). In terms of these 
indicators, the benefits of alternating work/training programmes are less pronounced for 
young men with a higher educational level (see Table 4.2.b). Moreover community jobs 
reduce significantly their chance of getting a regular job at the end of the current unemploy- 
ment spell. Indeed this chance is higher for a young man entering the labour market for 
the first time. However community jobs and programmes characterized by low training 
levels, such as "courses for preparation to the working life" (SIVP) and "courses for the 
1 6-to-25 years old" (other PEP), are associated with lower expected probabilities of becom- 
ing long-term unemployed and with shorter unemployment spells which in turn end up 
frequently with a re-entry into a training programme: for instance, 75% of unemployment 
spells occurring after employment in community jobs are directly followed by re-entries 
into programmes. 
Moreover let us notice that, when entering the labour market, young men holding a 
technical school certificate are more likely to have access to a training programme than 
less educated young males. So it is clear that participation in training programmes is 
highly selective. Finally, let us notice that the expected probability of becoming long-term 
unemployed does not increase significantly with the duration of the period of qualification 
for UI. 
Table 4.3 contains estimates of the expected probabilities of transition from regular 
jobs according to the state previously occupied. First of all, let us remark that the expected 
probability of a transition to unemployment is higher for young men previously par- 
ticipating to programmes in the public sector (TUC and other courses) than for those 
previously participating to alternating work/training programmes in the private sector 
(SIVP and contracts). On the whole, the expected average duration of a regular employ- 
ment spell (or equivalently the expected probability that it exceeds one year) is higher 
when it has been preceded by an alternating work/training programme in the private 
sector.'5 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This analysis has focused on the short-term impact of youth employment programmes set 
up in France during the 1980's on the labour market trajectories of recipients, especially 
on durations of their subsequent spells of unemployment and employment. Our study, 
using non-experimental transition data, has paid particular attention to the possible effects 
15. As a referee pointed out, omitting the age covariate may lead in particular to an overestimate of the 
permanence of employment spells for the sample as a whole. 
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TABLE 4.3 
Probability of transitions from regular (UDC) jobs 
(percentages) 
Previous state 
SIVP + Other courses + 
Destination state U + OLF LDC Contracts TUC 
Unemployment (U) 
N.d. 
Model A 47 8 64 6 39 1 51 9 
Model B 41 9 57 4 25 5 50 8 
T.C. 
Model A 52 0 54 0 33-4 69 8 
Model B 43-3 41 8 30 4 59 3 
Temporary jobs (LDC) 
N.d. 
Model A 23 5 3-6 27 4 19 0 
Model B 22 7 5 1 29-8 7 1 
T.c. 
Model A 26 9 27 9 36 2 17-5 
Model B 33-7 25-5 39-0 26-2 
Training programmes (PEP) 
N.d. 
Model A 108 12 3 12 7 15 2 
Model B 8-4 9 1 114 11 1 
T.c. 
Model A 14-4 7 5 20 9 8-6 
Model B 15 5 27 1 20 8 9 5 
prob (UDC > one year) 
N.d. 
Model A 28-7 34.9 34-3 20 6 
Model B 32 7 36 8 41 4 40 0 
T.c. 
Model A 39 9 55 6 51 6 22-2 
Model B 36 1 55 5 43 8 21 3 
Notes. Abbreviations for education levels: N.d. (no diploma), T.c. (technical school 
certificate). 
of unobserved individual heterogeneity on rates of transition towards programmes, thus 
capturing the potentially selective nature of training enrolment. A special emphasis has 
been put on the differential effects of various types of programmes (roughly speaking, 
workplace programmes in the private sector vs. "workfare" programmes in the public 
sector), according to the educational level of individuals. Estimates show that: 
(a) According to their nature and the amount of training they involve, youth employ- 
ment programmes have different effects on the recipients' trajectories; for 
instance, participation in alternating work/training programmes in the private 
sector increases the intensity of transition from the following unemployment spell 
to regular employment for young males with a low educational evel, while it has 
no effect on the same transition for young men holding a technical school certifi- 
cate; at the same time, the experience of a "workfare" programme in the public 
sector (e.g. a community job) has no effect on the intensity of transition from 
unemployment to regular jobs for the least educated young people, while it 
decreases significantly this transition intensity for young men with a vocational 
diploma; so participation in these programmes may act as a negative signal at 
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higher educational evels; however, for this subgroup of people, community jobs 
are associated with a lower average duration of unemployment and with a highly 
probable re-entry into programmes; simultaneously, a regular job preceded by an 
alternating work/training programme in the private sector has a higher expected 
duration than a regular job following a community job or a course in a public 
training centre; moreover, it ends less frequently with a transition to 
unemployment; 
(b) Participation in programmes is highly selective; it depends firstly on the state 
currently occupied (for instance, for young men holding a technical school cert- 
ificate, transitions from unemployment o programmes are more frequent than 
transitions from temporary employment o programmes); it depends also on the 
educational evel of young workers (the least educated ones move less intensively 
from unemployment o programmes); finally, it depends on past occurrences of 
programmes, but also on individual unobserved heterogeneity (at least, when we 
assume that this random heterogeneity follows a bivariate discrete distribution 
with two points of support); let us notice that we can only detect first-order 
effects of past programme occurrences 6; consequently, programme participation 
has a very short-term impact on individual labour market histories; 
(c) The duration of the period of entitlement o unemployment insurance (UI) does 
not increase the expected duration of unemployment spells; when they are still 
qualified for UI, the least educated young workers enter programmes more 
intensively; this could be due to an incentive effect resulting from the legislation 
on UI. Once again, this result is only verified under the assumption of a bivariate 
discrete distribution for the unobserved heterogeneity terms. 
Obviously many other questions could be addressed. In particular, one could try to 
examine the effects of exemptions from social contributions as incentives for firms to hire 
young workers in alternating work/training programmes. One could also try to know if 
firms substitute these subsidized jobs to regular or temporary ones. These questions are 
beyond the scope of this study, primarily because they require informations on firms which 
are not available in the data set we use. Finally, one could be interested in measuring the 
effects of introducing these programmes on the employment prospects of young workers 
as a group, and then in discussing the equilibrium effects of such policies. This could be 
done by estimating displacement effects which result from the fact that a transition into 
a workplace programme by any one worker affects the job-finding prospects of any other 
worker by filling a vacancy. The impossibility of ascertaining the importance of such an 
issue is clearly a limitation of the current research approach. 
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